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Summary findings
In the early 1980s  Chile reformed  its electricity  sector,  The authors  also show that the regulator's k'eakness
introducing  a regulatory  framework  that became  stemmed  not from lack of formal powers  hut from
influential  worldwide.  But in 1998 and 1999 La Nifia  vulnerability  to lobbyists  and a lack of independence.
brought one of the worst droughts  on record, causing  a  Moreover,  the regulator  seems  not to have  fully
price system  collapse,  random power  outages,  and three-  understood  the incentives  in the price system  cluring
hour rotating electricity  cuts.  supply  restrictions.
F  ischer  and Galetovic  study  the interaction  between  The authors conclude  that the Chilean  shortage  shows
regulatory  incentives  and governance  during the 1998-  the limitations  of a rigid price system  requiring  heavy
99 electricity  shortage,  showing  that the supply  regulatory  intervention.  This suggests  that cou:ntries
restriction  could have  been managed  without  outages.  whose  governance  structures  are ill suited to dlealing  with
The shortage  can be blamed on a rigid price system,  loopholes  left by the law should rely as much ais  possible
which  was unable to respond  to large supply  shocks,  and  on market rules  that clearly  allocate  property rights  ex
on deficient  regulatory  governance,  which  led to a weak  ante and leave  the terms of contracts  to be freely
regulator  unable to make  the system  work.  negotiated  by private  parties.
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in the institute  to increase  the understanding  of infrastructure  regulation.  Copies  of the paper are available  f ece  from the
World  Bank,  1818 H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Gabriela  Chenet-Sniith,  room  J3  -304,  telephone
202-473-6370, fax 202-676-9874, email address gchenet@worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Working Papers are also
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The authors may be contacted at rfischer(d,dii.uchile.cL  or agaleto
@dii.uchile.cl.  November  2001. (31  pages)
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Until 1980,  electric regulation  in Chile followed  the usual pattern  of contemporary  electrical systems: state-
owned firms that were vertically  integrated  and subject  to rate of return regulation.  The operation  of electric
generation companies  (gencos)  was inefficient,  a consequence  of the state not having an independent
regulatory agency capable  of regulating  its own firms and of prices that were set in order to respond  to short
term political objectives.  This structure  was drastically  reformed  in the early eighties.!  What was then a
revolutionary  price system  was introduced,  electric generation  was decentralized  and functionally  separated
from transmission  and distribution,  and incentive  regulation  was introduced  in distribution.  These massive
changes in regulatory incentives  were supplemented  with the creation  of a new regulatory agency with a
ministerial  rank, the Comisi6n  Nacional de Energia (henceforth  CNE), followed  by the privatization  of the
industry in the late eighties. 2
Chile's regulatory reformns  have been quite successful.  The regulatory  incentives  they introduced  became a
standard reference for reform in several  countries. 3 Substantial  new investments  were made following
privatization  and operating  efficiency  increased  significantly. 4 Despite this success,  however,  relations
among the privatized  firms, and between firms and the regulator,  became  increasingly  adversarial,  as
inconsistencies  and loopholes  in the law began to surface. 5 These loopholes  were unimportant  while the
industry was state-owned,  but after privatization  they became a source  of wealth transfers  between
electric companies.  Regulatory  governance  has proven  inadequate  to fill in these loopholes  and the
regulator's  decisions  are frequently  disputed  in court.
These problems became  acute during  the 1998-1999  energy supply restriction,  when the La Nina
phenomenon  brought one of the worst droughts  on record. 6 Disputes  between  gencos  and the loopholes in
the law caused the collapse  of the price system  and led to random  power failures  and energy  rationing in
November 1998.  By April 1999,  as water stored  in reservoirs  began to run out, electricity  supply in Santiago
was curtailed  three hours a day, random  power failures  were frequent  and experts  were forecasting six-hour
long electricity  cuts. In response  to the public outcry,  the government  introduced  legal changes in June 1999.
Unfortunately,  some of these changes appear  to be inconsistent  with the current  price system, which implies
that future problems  are in store. What  are the explanations  for the failure  of Chile's supposedly  modem
system of regulatory govemance?
In this paper we argue that the failure of regulatory  governance  and incentives  has two main causes. First,
the extreme rigidity of the price system. This inflexibility  makes it unresponsive  to the large variations in
energy supply that are endemic  due to the importance  of hydroelectric  (hydro)  generation and the variability
in hydrological  conditions.  Second, the only way in which the current  price system  can be made to work
during periods of supply restrictions  is through heavy and skillful  regulatory  intervention.  The regulator
must determine  in advance  the opportunity  cost of energy  when supplies  are restricted,  enforce the
' The  key law  is the DL  N' I of 1982.  It can  be found  in  http://www.cne.cl.
2 See  Bernstein  (1988)  and  Spiller  and  Viana  (1996)  for an overview  of the restructuring  process  in the electrical  sector.
3Here  we follow  Levi  and Spiller's  (1996,  p.4)  classification.  They  distinguish  between  "regulatory  governance"  and
"regulatory  incentives".  The  governance  structure  refers  to the mechanisms  that  restrain  the regulator's  discretion  and
arbitrate  conflicts  that  originate  in these  restraints.  "Regulatory  incentives"  are the  rules  governing  pricing,  subsidies,
competition,  entry,  interconnection  and  the like.
4For  example,  capacity  increased  from  around  $4,000$  MW  in 1990  to  6,000  MW  in 1998.
5It stands  to  reason  that  there  are opposed  interests  among  firms  and  between  firms  and  regulators.  The  problem  in
Chile  is that  many  disputes  end  in the  extremely  slow  and  non-informed  judicial  system,  where  they  escape  the
ordinary  mechanisms  of dispute  resolution.  For  a discussion  of conflicts  in  the electricity  sector  in Chile  see  Basafies,
Saavedra  and  Soto  (1999).
6 By "supply restriction"  we mean a fall of energy supply, which could be due to a drought  or the failure of a power
plant. By "shortage" we mean an excess demand  for energy,  which usually leads  to outages.
2administrative  measures  needed to confront  users with that cost and fill in the voids in the law's numerous
loopholes  by settling disputes  between gencos.
A major problem is that the ex ante estimation  of this opportunity  cost represents  a formidable informational
requirement  for the regulator.  A second  problem appears  because  of the deficiencies  of regulatory
governance.  The executive,  who is the nominal  overseer of the regulator,  is vulnerable to lobbying pressures
and has shown little willingness  to settle disputes which  would  result in large wealth transfers between
companies  or between companies  and the public. For example,  during the shortage the regulator did not act
fast to settle disputes among  gencos concerning  the price of energy  in the pool, despite being legally
required  to arbitrate  in these conflicts.  Moreover,  the regulator  has not been able to enforce the payment of
compensations  to consumers,  which are essential  to transmit  them the opportunity cost of energy during a
supply restriction. Another  example of these failures was the tardiness in issuing a rationing  decree, which
forces gencos  to allocate shortages  among  users and allows  distributors  to cut energy supply when
necessary,  without triggering  penalties. The fear of the political  repercussions  of acknowledging  that energy
supplies were tight led to repeated postponements  of the decree, thus allowing  the use of the scant  remaining
reserves of stored water, worsening later outages.  The unwillingness  to resolve conflicts is occasionally
broken by hasty measures designed  to reduce the public  outcry caused by outages.
The Chilean electricity shortage  is a good case study  of the interaction  between regulatory incentives  and
governance. The price system  fulfills its role of allocating  energy  production  when there is sufficient
capacity  to meet demand  at regulated,  non contingent  prices. However,  it imposes rigid prices that do not
allow automatic  adjustments  when supply restrictions  make it physically  impossible  to meet demand at the
regulated  prices. 7 Rigid prices in a regulated  market shift  the burden of allocating resources  to the regulater.
The problem is that regulator is weak, being vulnerable  to lobbying  pressures,  reluctant  to assume political
risks, and its rulings can be easily delayed in the legal system.  Thus, the example of the Chilean energy
shortages  suggests  that heavily regulated  systems  requiring the skilful intervention  of the regulator  have
serious problems  under weak governance  structures.  It also  highlights  the advantages  of flexible  price
systems  which transmit automatically  the opportunity  cost of energy to firms and users when governance is
weak.
Before proceeding  we call attention  to three caveats. First, we focus on the short run response to supply
restrictions.  We do not study the effects of regulatory governance  and incentives  on investment decisions,
which obviously affect the magnitude and frequency  of supply  restrictions;  see DGS (1999) for a formal
long-run analysis. Second,  our analysis is relevant for energy  and not for power shortages. Energy shortages
can last several months and are predictable.  By contrast,  power  outages are sudden and seldom last more
than a day. 8 Third, we concentrate  on the power generation  sector, as transmission  and distribution  played
subsidiary  roles in the crisis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe  the basics aspects of the regulatory
govemance  and the price system in Chile.  In section 3 we analyze  the causes of the shortage and the role
played by regulatory  institutions.  Section  4 discusses  the conclusions.
2. Governance  and prices in Chile
In this section we describe  the institutions  that regulate the electricity  sector in Chile (regulatory
governance)  and the conceptual  underpinnings  of the price system in power generation.  We also discuss one
of the main structural  features  of the market, Chile's extreme  hydrological  variability.
7 The Chilean price system is even worse at handling  situations in which the shortage is due to demand shocks.  See
Diaz, Galetovic  and Soto (1999, p. 20; henceforth  DGS).
8 See Sanghvi (1983) for a discussion  of the difference between energy and power  shortages.
32.1 Regulatory  governance
There are four institutions  that oversee  the workings  of the electricity  market:  the CNE, the Ministry of
Economics,  the Superintendency  of Electricity  and Fuels (henceforth  SEC, its spanish  acronym) and the
Economic  Load Dispatch Center (henceforth  CDEC,  its spanish acronym),  the pool operator. We describe
the role of each in turn.
The CNE The CNE advises the government  on energy policy. The head of the CNE has ministerial  rank,
but, somewhat  inconsistently,  the CNE is governed  by a board that includes  5 additional  ministers.  This
board reports directly  to the President.  An executive secretariat  is in charge of operations.  The CNE studies
and proposes regulations,  calculates  regulated  prices, provides technical  advice to the government  and is in
charge of the technical  oversight of the sector. Regulatory  rule changes are usually  prepared  by the CNE. It
is important  to note that CNE regulates  and advises the government,  but it has no power to enforce
compliance.
The CDEC The pool regulator  coordinates  the operation  of the generation-transmission  system  in central
Chile and is responsible  for system  security. 9The CDEC must inform gencos  of current demand and supply
conditions,  coordinate  power plant maintenance  and verify compliance  with the system's  operational  rules.
Finally, the CDEC determines the spot price at which transfers of energy and power  between gencos are
valued (see below).
Unfortunately,  the 1982  electric law and its 1985  statute  left the internal  operations  of the CDEC somewhat
undefined.  CDEC includes only power  gencos  with more than 2% of the installed capacity  and transmission
companies  with at least 100  km of transmission  lines.' 0 At the time  of the shortage,  it was composed  by a
board, an operations directorate  and several working  groups organized  by area. The board governed the
institution.  Each member  had one vote and the presidency  rotated among  all members.  The pool operation
was managed by an operations  directorate  which included  a representative  of each company.  It was
responsible  for coordinating  dispatch, verify the calculations  and studies  elaborated  by the different  working
groups and ratify each month the balance  of physical  and pecuniary transfers  between gencos  made by the
respective  working  groups. An important  weakness was that disputes  within the operations  directorate  had
to be referred to the board, which could only settle them by consensus.  If the board was unable to reach the
required consensus,  the Economics  Minister was responsible  for issuing a decision  within 120 days. This
implied that unsettled issues could linger for a long time, and in the meantime  decisions  taken by the
operations  directorate on these issues were not legally binding  on the companies.
The independence  of the CDEC increased  after the companies  implemented  in June 1999  the changes that
had been introduced in the statute  to the law which mandated  an independent  CDEC. While it is still
governed  by a board of company representatives,  its operations  are delegated  to independent  personnel.  The
procedures and models required  to operate the system  and model parameters  are set by the independent
operations  directorate.  A board member  who disagrees  with a decision  made by the operations  directorate
can ask the board for a review-  As before, the board needs a consensus  to settle disputes,  but if no
unanimous decisions  is reached,  the conflict  is referred  to an expert  commitee,  which has 30 days to issue an
opinion. If the decision  is still  not accepted  unanimously  by the board, it is referred to the economics
minister, who has 60 days to settle  the conflict. The most important  change,  however, is that the decision  of
the operations  directorate  is legally binding  while a verdict is pending.
9 There is a large independent  system  operating  in the north of the country  and two small systems  operating in the
extreme south.
10  There have been arguments  pointing  out that the lack of defined rules has been a major barrier  to entry into
generation.  Moreover,  the major generator  (60%  of capacity)  owned the main transmission  company.
4The Ministry of Economics  The Ministry of Economics  is responsible  for setting  tariffs following the
proposals of the CNE.  ' 1  In addition,  it has two functions  that are of particular importance  during a supply
restriction. First, as seen  before, by law it must settle the disputes  between  gencos that emerge in the CDE  C.
Second,  it is in charge of issuing  rationing decrees.  In both cases the law forces  the Minister to ask for a
technical report from CNE.
The SEC The SEC is an independent  supervisory  agency  that reports  directly  to the President.  It is
responsible  for monitoring  compliance  with the law and its regulations.  Among its duties are verifying
compliance  with service quality  standards  and investigating  the causes  of outages.  Until recently the fines
that it could impose for noncompliance  were very low: the maximum  fine was about US$26,000.  Changes
introduced  in June 1999 increased  the maximum  fine to about US$6 million.  Moreover,  the decisions of the
SEC were usually delayed by companies  appeals in court. The legislative  changes introduced  in June 1999
raised fines and determined  that before going to court, the firm had to post 25% of the fine.
2.2 Regulatory  incentives
In this subsection  we describe Chile's  hydrological  variability  which is the main structural  feature that
determines  the effectiveness  of regulatory governance  and incentives.  Last, we describe  the main
characteristics  of the price system.
2.2.1 Hydrological  variability  in Chile
Figure 1 shows  the amount of GWh that could have been generated  each hydrological  year using the current
installed  hydro capacity. Annual energy consumption  in Chile is around  25,000 GWh. In a rainy year sLch
as 1972-73  or 1992-93  nearly all the energy requirements  can be supplied  with hydro generation.' 2 By
contrast,  during an extreme drought such as those of 1968-69  or 1998-99,  hydro generation cannot supply
more  than 9,000 GWh (or 40%) of annual consumption.  In an average  year, about 80% of annual
consumption  can be supplied with hydro generation.
Despite  this extreme hydrological  variability,  around 60% of consumers  (by volume)  pay regulated,  non-
contingent  prices (see below), which leads to consumption  pattems that are unrelated  to energy availabil:ity.
However,  given the variability  of supply,  it is inefficient  for consumption  to remain constant in dry years.1 3
Equivalently,  it is inefficient  to invest in enough thermal  capacity  to make up all of the energy shortfall
during a drought.  The problem  thus becomes  one of deciding  the appropriate  rules for allocating shortfalls.
An efficient, automatic solution  is to increase  the price to reflect the higher opportunity  cost of energy
during droughts.  This obvious solution  was not deemed  acceptable  by the designers  of the Chilean electric
legislation,  who believed  consumers  and gencos were too risk averse  to accept the price variability implicit
in the system. A second  option is to suffer  the recurrent  random outages  that characterized  the 1998--95
hydrological  year, which are costly and inefficient.  Chile adopted  what looked like a third alternative,  under
which consumers  pay for the expected  non-supplied  energy during supply  restrictions  in their regular b ll, in
'  In this role, the Ministry acts as a fail-safe  switch, by providing  an additional  stage at which incorrect  prices can be
vetoed.}
12 According  to the electric legislation,  the hydrological  year begins in April and ends in March of the following  ) ear.
The rainy season in central Chile runs from May through September.  The thaw in the Andes  mountains (where water is
stored as snow) starts in October and ends in March. To avoid confusion,  we adopt the following convention: 199%-99
refers to the hydrological  year that began in April 1998  and ended in March 1999.  1998--1999  refers to the
chronological  period which includes calendar  years 1998 and 1999.
13  See Serra (1997) and DGS (1999) for a proof of these results.
5order to finance an incentive scheme  that in principle  reduces  energy use efficiently  during  droughts  (see
below).' 4
It is usually believed that large hydrological  variability  is responsible  for the large transfers  of energy
between gencos specialized  in different  sources  of energy.  According  to this belief gencos specialized  in
hydro generation will inevitably  buy energy produced  in thermal  plants and, conversely  gencos specialized
in thermal generation will be on the buying side  in wet years. As can be seen from table 1, most hydro
capacity  in Chile is owned by Endesa and Colbun.  The third large genco, Gener,  is mainly  thermal.
While during the shortage buying and selling positions  coincided  with this belief---Colbiun  and Endesa
where in deficit and Gener had energy surpluses---,this  pattern is neither a structural  feature of the system
nor would it necessarily disappear  had gencos  a more balanced  generation  portfolio. The reason is that
whether a genco is in surplus or deficit depends  also and fundamentally  on its commercial  policy. A thermal
generator  whose contracts  exceed its capacity  will be on the buying side on a dry year, and, conversely,  a
hydro genco that follows a conservative  commercial  policy may be on the selling side even in a dry  year. A
central  point of our analysis is that incentives  during  a supply restriction  will depend  on the net buying or
selling position  of a genco and not on its generation  portfolio.
2.2.2 The price system
The preceding discussion  shows  that hydrological  variability  makes a well designed  price system  necessary
both to ensure that users see the opportunity  cost of energy and that exchanges  between gencos  occur
smoothly.  We now describe  the Chilean  price system,  focusing  on the mechanisms  which are supposed  to
deal with large reductions  in available  energy.  Since the generation  market is structured  around  three prices-
--spot, node (or regulated)  and free--each corresponding  to one market.  We describe  them in turn. 15
Exchanges  between  gencos The order in which  generating  plants operate is determined  by the CDEC.
Given current demand,  dispatch  is made according  to strict merit order after accounting for transmission
constraints.  Gencos do not make bids; dispatch  is made according  to their marginal operating  costs, which
are fixed according to technical operation  parameters  and fuel costs.
By law dispatch  is mandatory  whenever  the plant is available  and the CDEC commands  it to start operating.
This implies that dispatch  is independent  of a genco's  contracts.  Gencos  that sell more energy  than they
produce are required  to buy the difference  in the spot market  at the spot price. Each month CDEC settles
accounts  between  gencos. Unfortunately,  neither  the law nor the CDEC's 1985  statute indicated a specific
procedure  to settle accounts, a shortcoming  that had important  consequences  during  the shortage.
The spot price always equals the opportunity  cost of water stored in the Laja reservoir.  When full, the Laja
reservoir (Laja lake) holds enough water to generate about 7,000  GWh, around one-fourth  of annual
consumption.  Since installed capacity  on the Laja effluents  is limited to 2,500GWh,  energy can be stored for
succeeding  years. The rate at which water in the Laja  reservoir is used is governed  by a stochastic  dynamic
programming  model called OMSIC.  The model trades off the benefit of using water today to generate
power, thus displacing thermal  generation,  against the cost of not having water available  in the future and
thus having to use thermal generation  or ration energy. OMSIC  uses as data the current level of the Laja
reservoir  and estimates  the probability  of future hydrologies  using a supposedly  representative  window of 40
years of past hydrologies  (1940-41 through 1980-81  during  the shortage).  Each yearly hydrology  is assumed
equiprobable  and statistically  independent.  The output of the model indicates  the amount of water that
14 See Bernstein  and Agurto (1992).
15 There  are regulated  and free  prices  for  transmission  and  distribution,  but as they  do not  play  a large  part  in  the crisis
of 1998-1999,  we  do not describe  them.
6should be drawn from the reservoir and the shadow price of the remaining water. This shadow price is the
system's marginal cost or spot price, which is adjusted hourly.
Under normal  conditions, the opportunity cost of water equals the operating cost of the most expensive
thermal plant dispatched.  By contrast, in all the hydrological  scenarios in which the model predicts a
shortage, energy transfers  between power gencos are valued at the  outage cost. This outage cost is the
average  cost to users of a shortage, estimated from user surveys which are conducted infrequently  (only two
surveys have ever been made, the last ten years ago; see CNE [1986] and Fierro and Serra [1993] and
[1997]).16 The value of the outage cost depends on the depth of the restriction. It was estimated  at 139.7
mills/KWh  for a restriction of less than 10% of current demand; 232.5 mills/KWh if the difference is
between  10 and 20% and 330 mills/KWh  if the restriction is larger.'7 Note that under normal  conditions,  the
average spot price is about 30 mills/KWh  (see Figure 2).18  Outage costs assume that restrictions  are planned
and announced  well ahead of time so large users can adapt their processes or install generating  capacity  arid
residential  users can adapt their behavior. The cost of unexpected energy cuts is obviously much higher.
The regulated market The spot price is subject to extreme variations during the year and even during
shorter periods  (see Figure 2). In May 1997, for example, just before the Nifio current arrived in Chile, water
in reservoirs  was running  out and the spot price rose to the outage cost. By contrast, in December of the
sarne year reservoirs  were spilling and the spot price was close to zero. When the law was introduced it was
thciught that such extreme variations in price were unacceptable  to residential users and gencos, hence
politically unfeasible. Hence the price at which distributors  sell to residential and other small users with less
than 2MW of installed capacity was regulated.1 9 Moreover,  the law made it mandatory for gencos to sell at
the regulated  price to distributors.
The regulated price (node price) is calculated every six months  by the CNE and corresponds  to the expected
marginal cost averaged over the next 24 to 48 months. 20 To fix this price the CNE runs a stochastic  dynairmic
programming  model called GOL (a coarser version of OMSIC) which, given a ten year projection  of peak
power and energy demand, minimizes the expected cost of generation and outage by optimally  using the
water in the Laja reservoir (note that the model explicitly accepts that outages may occur in the optimal
solution).  This model takes existing plants as given, but optimizes entry of future plants over the ten-yeai
horizon.  As in OMSIC, GOL estimates the probability of future hydrologies  using a sample of 40 past
hydrologies.
Within each six month period the node price remains fixed, independently of demand and supply conditions.
Nevertheless,  there is a mechanism to ration excess energy demand. When a shortage occurs the regulator
issues a rationing  decree. Under rationing, regulated consumers should be paid the difference between  the
outage cost and the node price (i.e., around 110 mills/KWh  for a 10% restriction) for each undelivered  KWh,
i.e,  energy that would have been consumed at the regulated price if it had been available. Of course, it is
necessary to estimate non-delivered energy, since the regulator does not know how many KWh would have
16 Surveyed  users  were asked to estimate  the cost of reducing  "normal" energy use by 10%,  20% and more than 209.
Users were told that these restrictions  will be announced  months in advance,  given that energy (as opposed to power
outages)  can be predicted.
17 A "mill" is a thousandth  of a dollar,  and the standard  unit used in the industry
18 Beginning  in July 1998  there was  disagreement  within CDEC  on the spot  price. For this reason,  prices reported in the
figure are not official  during that period.
19 The designers  of the law assumed that large consumers  would be able to negotiate  their contracts and were always
capable of self-generating  their power needs if unable to arrange a satisfactory  contract.
20 CNE chooses  the exact length of the period. During the shortage  the expected  marginal  cost was averaged over the
next 48 months.
7been consumed  had the shortage  not occurred. The legislation  sets the amount to be paid to a regulated  user
is defined according to the following  formula:
[(1  + g,)  .(supplied energy) _,  - (supplied energy), ] x [(outage cost) - PN]
where t is the period when the shortage  occurs,  g, is the rate of growth  of aggregate  energy demand  betwen t-
I and t projected in the previous  calculation  of the node price andpN is the current node price.It can be
shown  that under a set of stringent  conditions  this scheme  of compensations  replicates the allocation of
energy  under a free market  for energy. 2' To see this, refer to Figure 3. Assume that  x(t) KWh of energy are
available,  which is less than energy demanded  at the node pricepN,  xd(pN).  If the regulator sets the outage
cost at D- 1[x(t)]  and (I +g,)x(t-  1) is sufficiently  large,  then the opportunity  cost of consuming  an additional
KWh equals the social  opportunity  cost---the  price that would emerge in a spot market. However, there are
several  problems with this scheme:  first, since the outage cost  is determined  ex ante, there is no guarantee
that it is the right compensation,  i.e. the one that equates demand  to energy supply during the supply
restriction. Proceeding  to minuter details  that have important  consequences,  the law does not specify  how
the period t-l is determined  and its interpretation  is determined  by the regulator,  but can be contested  in
court. For example, the relevant  period may be the same month or week during  the previous year; or the
regulator  may decide that compensations  have to be paid for the whole  time the rationing decree is in force,
or only during those hours when restrictions  occurred.  The choice  between  these altematives will affect
gencos  and consumers,  since large amounts of money are involved.
Note that compensations  have been pre-paid  by users (in expected  value), because  the GOL model (which
determines  node prices) admits scenarios in which energy shortages  occur, in which case energy  is valued at
the outage cost. Hence,  the fact  that gencos  pay compensations  for non-provision  of electricity in a drought
does not imply that they will lose money in expected  value,  provided that the node price is an unbiased
predictor  of marginal  costs. However,  this compensations  mechanism  was weakened  by the addition of a
codicil (the notorious  article  99 bis) that limited compensations  in the case of extremely  severe droughts. 22
The reason for introducing  the codicil was that the worst hydrological  year included  in the GOL forecasts  of
future hydrologies  was 1968-69.  This, it was argued,  was needed to prevent gencos from losing money,
since users were not insuring  themselves  against years that were drier than the driest considered  when
calculating  node prices. 23 It can be shown that this limitation  is ineffective  and unnecessary  to prevent losses
in a steady state. 24 However,  the biggest problem  caused by article  99 bis during the 1998-1999  shortage was
that it did not define  any price-setting  rules under conditions  worse than 1968-69.  This meant that the
opportunity  cost of energy for regulated  users was still  the node price, since they were not compensated  for
undelivered  energy.
The free market  Thefree clients,  those with installed  power of more than 2 MW, face a much simpler  price
system. These users  negotiate energy contracts directly  with gencos.  These contracts  establish supply
conditions,  reliability  and prices. While a significant  fraction of these contracts  are closed at prices which
21 For formal proofs  see Serra (1997)  and DGS (1999).
22 There is no clear explanation  for the continued existence  of article 99 bis. It was introduced  just before the military
government  handed  power to a democratic  government.  At that time, many laws were modified by last minute clauses
which were not analyzed  carefully.  Afterwards  firms were strongly  opposed to any changes in the law, under the
perception  that any attempt at small corrections  would lead to widespread  and perhaps  populist changes to the electric
legislation.
23 See Bernstein  and Agurto (1992).
24 DGS (1999) show  this formally.  Note that the long run equilibrium  without article 99 bis involves  a mix of power
plants that has a greater thermal  component.
8reflect supply conditions only in the long-run, contracts can be freely renegotiated  during a supply
restriction. If the spot price of energy climbs above the user's valuation  of energy, it seems natural to expect
that the genco and the user will undertake a mutually advantageous renegotiation.
By their nature, the regulator has no power over the contracts signed by free agents with their energy
providers,  and this  stated in the electric legislation. 25 In April  1999, however, the regulator imposed
proportional  rationing  on all users, in violation of the law.
2.2.3 The price system during supply restrictions
As we have mentioned before, when energy supplies  are restricted  the spot price should rise to the outage
cost and (if the regulator issues a rationing  decree)  gencos will pay regulated  users the difference  between
the outage cost and the node price for non-delivered  energy.  This means that all market  participants see the
opportunity  cost of energy at the margin, and  no shortage  occurs:
*  Gencos  who are net buyers in the spot market  pay the outage cost for each KWh. Moreover,  they are
indifferent  between supplying additional  energy  to regulated  users and paying the compensation,
because in both cases they pay (outage cost  -PN), wherepN  is the regulated  or node price.
*  Gencos who are net sellers in the spot market  receive  the outage cost for the energy they sell.
*  A regulated  user receives (outage  cost -pN) for each non-consumed  KWh. Hence,  the opportunity  cost
of consuming  an additional KWh is (pN +outage cost -pN)=outage  cost.
*  Gencos (both net sellers and net buyers) 26 have incentives  to bargain with free clients  who value
marginal energy at less than outage cost.  Assuming  low transactions  costs, Coase's theorem implies that
bargaining  between gencos  and free clients  should lead to reductions in energy consumption  up to the
point where the value of energy at the margin equals the outage cost.
In theory,  therefore, the law defined prices that were able to allocate energy efficiently  during periods of
supply restrictions.  In the next section  we analyze  why the system  failed during 1998  and 1999.
3. Regulatory incentives and governance during the 1998-1999 shortage
In this section we argue that there were three reasons for the  1998-1999  shortage: first, available energ,y
was low from May  1998 onwards, partly because reservoir water had been used aggressively,  partly because
there was little rainfall during  the rainy season  that followed and partly because the combined-cycle  gas
plant Nehuenco  failed to enter. Second, the price system  was incomplete  i.e., there were conditions  (years
with less rainfall than 1968-69)  when the regulated  price was not far from the equilibrium  price. Third,
regulatory govemance  proved inadequate  to respond to these two problems. We begin the section with a
description  of the fundamental  reason for the shortage (the "material" causes).  Next we show that the
rigidity and loopholes  embedded in the price system  made it unsuitable to manage a severe supply
restriction. Finally,  we examine the failures of the regulatory  institutions  during the shortage. In the
appendix we provide a short cronology  of the shortage.
3.1 The shortage's  material  causes
25 Article 91 of the law.
26 At any given time a genco can be a net seller or a net buyer, given the contracts  that it has signed and the ownership
of the power plants that are operating
9Even though reserves  became  very tight from July 1998  onwards,  deficits and outages  occurred  only during
November 1998  and between  April and June 1999.  According  to the CNE,  the aggregate  deficit over these
months was about 450 GWh. 27 To get a feeling of the order of magnitude  of this Figure,  recall that annual
consumption  in Chile is about 25,000 GWh, and daily consumption  in a normal day is about 80 GWh.
Low initial  level of reservoirs As can be seen from Figure 4, the reserves of energy  kept in reservoirs were
initially low, fell dramatically  during 1998 and remained  low until mid 1999.  Energy  in reservoirs as of
January 1, 1998  was about 3,650  GWh.
As mentioned before, the Laja lake is by far the largest reservoir.  The amount  of water in it is measured  by it
height above sea level, or cota. When full the level of the Laja  lake stands at 1,368  m. By contrast,  the lake
is almost empty  at cota  1,31  Om.  As can be seen  from Figure 5, water almost ran out in 1997.  The 1997
winter was very rainy due to El Nino, but that was enough to fill  just a third of the reservoir.  Consequently,
at the beginning of 1998 its level was at 1,330  m.
Excessive use of water in reservoirs  As can be seen from Figure 5 the level of the Laja reservoir fell
quickly during  the first half of 1998,  as the  El Toro and  Antuco power plants were run at close  to capacity
from mid-February  on. The lake's  level reached 1,316  m in June.
In addition,  the government,  represented  by the Ministry  of Public works, sold Endesa,  the main hydro-
power genco, additional  water in the Laja lake equivalent  to 316 GWh of energy. This water was used
during July and August,  so by September,  the cota reached 1,310  m. Also, Endesa  was granted the
equivalent  of 200 GWh of water from the Maule reservoir.
Severe drought  and protracted  failure of the Nehuenco combined-cycle  gas plant The 1998-99  winter
was one of the driest on record, and worse than the 1968-69  hydrological  year. For example, as can be seen
from table 2, during  the 1998-99  hydrological  year affluents  into the Laja  reservoir carried  65% less water
than in a normal year and 35% less than 1968-69.  This meant less energy available  because hydro plants
generated  less. It also meant less accumulation  of snow in the Andes, which implied  that there would  be less
water available  during  the thaw (October  through March) so reservoirs would  remain almost empty  until the
new rainy season. Hence,  by August 1998  it seemed  very likely that there would  be supply restrictions  until
at least mid-1999.
In addition,  the Nehuenco  370MW  combined-cycle  plant, an experimental  prototype  designed to generate
2,600 GWh/year  at full capacity,  was unable to run normally  until December 1998.  It broke down again in
late March 1999,  requiring extensive  repairs.  To get an idea of how important  this protracted failure  was,
note that had Nehuenco  run normally after November 1998,  it would have produced  about 8 GWh a day.
Hence the 81 days of deficit would  have been reduced to just 26.28  Moreover,  this is an underestimate,  since
reservoir water could have been saved  had entry occurred  at any moment during  the first half of 1998, as
Colbun repeatedly  announced. 29
3.2 The fundamental  rigidity  of the Chilean  price system
The preceding subsection suggests  that the material causes of the supply  restriction  were the drought and the
protracted  breakdown  of the Nehuenco  combined-cycle  plant. However,  as discussed  before, the price
27 See  Generaci6n  bruta mensual SIC-SING  at http://www.cne.cl/cnenew/electricidad/electric.htm.  The  size of the
shortage  was  76 GWh  in  November,  160  GWh  in  April,  134  GWh  in May  and  79 GWh  in  June.
28 To obtain these figures  we added  Nehuenco's energy  production to daily deficits and subtracted  8 GWh, Nehuenco's
normal daily output  when it runs without  failures.
29 A chronology  of Nehuencos problems up to December 1998  appears in Camara de Diputados  (1999, pp. 83-94).
10system is theoretically  designed to accommodate a supply restriction without suffering  shortages. The
problem  is that there are fundamental limitations that prevent this mechanism from achieving an efficient
allocation of energy. Compensations to regulated users are supposed to play a key role in transmitting  the
opportunity  cost of energy to regulated users during periods of supply restrictions.  Efficiency requires that
the outage cost equals the marginal value of energy during a supply restriction, Da'[x(t)] on Figure 3, but this
requires that the regulator must know ex ante both the demand curve and the amount of energy that will be
available  during the supply restriction. But, since D-'[x(t)] is by definition contingent, the regulator  uses za
coarse approximation  to D-' [x(t)] Thus, it is unlikely that the outage cost will reflect the opportunity cost cf
energy during  a supply restriction.
While the outage cost might be an approximation, one might argue that it sends the correct signals to the
regulated market,  since its value is several times the normal cost of energy. Unfortunately,  compensations  of
any significance  have never been paid, thus providing the wrong signals to gencos and users. During the
1998-1999 shortage, gencos that could not fulfill their contracts at the regulated price (i.e., with distribution
companies)  argued that the hydrology was drier than the driest year included in the regulated price
calculations  (see below). In the previous shortage of 1989 and 1990, the main genco (Endesa) challenged  the
obligation of compensations  by arguing that the law was passed after contracts with distribution companies
had been signed. This argument was successful in court. Thus, it seems reasonable  to expect that users andc
gencos will not face higher opportunity costs of energy during supply restrictions. In that case, the market
will have no forces making it converge to equilibrium:
*  Since there is no obligation to compensate users for undelivered energy, gencos that are net buyers ir  the
spot market prefer not to supply regulated users, while continuing to supply free clients under contraclt. 30
If they supply regulated users, they have to pay the outage cost for energy in order to resell it at the node
price  PN, leading to a net loss of (PN - outage cost) per KWh.
*  The opportunity cost of energy for a regulated user is still the node price, PN (see Figure 3). Hence, they
do not change their demand for energy.
In addition to being rigid in the short run, the price system is unresponsive to medium term changes in
supply conditions (six months  to a year). As we have seen in section 2, the node price equals the expected
marginal cost averaged over the next 48 months. This implies that a severe current drought will enter the
calculation of the node price only through the low current level of the Laja reservoir but its effect is dilut,-d
in the operation of the GOL model, where all possible hydrologies are included with equal probability  and
by the planned entry of new plants. Thus it was that by April 1998 the GOL simulations,  which included
several new combined-cycle  gas plants that were presumed to enter in the future, made the node price drop
by about  11  %. In October  1998, when it was clear that the country was suffering  a severe drought, the nclde
price fell a further  8%, even though it obvious that there was very little snow in the Andes so the runoff
would be one of the lowest on record. The node price dropped a further 5% in April  1999, just  before
random outages began. Thus, even though it was apparent that energy would be in short supply, node prices
dropped by almost 25% during  1998 and the first half of 1999, which must  have provided,  to say the least,
3  1 the wrong signals to consumers.
30 This behavior  is equivalent  to an insurance  company  not paying  a policy in case of accident.  Normally,  it is
automatically  regulated  by the potential loss of reputation  of the insurance  company.  This is not the case for the
legislated  "insurance" enmeshed  in Chilean electric  prices.
31 The methodology  led to somewhat  curious outcomes.  Endesa installed  about 450 MW of new capacity between
February  and April 1999  in response  to the shortage. According  to the rules, the CNE assumed that the new turbines
would remain there at least two years, and that that made the node price drop even further.
11Some analysts have argued that the demand for energy is not at all price responsive, so that the decline in the
node price should have had no effect on energy consumption. Nevertheless,  even a small elasticity of
demand of the order of 0.2 would imply an increase of about 2% in the quantity demanded, a substantial
amount given that the daily deficits during outages were about 8% of "normal"  demand. 32 33
Note that we have  shown the existence of two sets of different problems. First, the fact that in practice
electric companies have never paid compensations of any significance meant that the price system is not in
equilibrium under severe droughts, a result of article  99 bis. Second, the fact that regulated prices do not
rise even when there is the certainty that energy will be in short supply leads users to be unresponsive to
declines in supply.
3.3 Regulatory  governance  and the 1998-1999 shortage
In the previous  subsection  we have argued that the rules of the Chilean price system cannot accommodate
large supply restrictions. As Williamson (1985 ch.1) has stressed, when transactions  cannot be (or are not)
organized under a price system, governance structures become the main determinant of resource allocation.
We now examine  the weaknesses of Chile's regulatory governance and its failure to prevent outages.
Why was water  used so quickly? As we have mentioned, the use of reserves is theoretically  dictated by the
OMSIC model which values water at its intertemporal opportunity cost. In practice, however,  the use of
water in reservoirs has frequently been the result of haggling between gencos and there is evidence that it
was used too quickly during the period preceding  the outages.
To see the incentives at play consider the sequence of events as a severe drought unfolds. The spot price
should gradually increase as water becomes scarce and more expensive thermal plants begin to operate.
Moreover, since water can be stored for future use, a shortage that is predicted in the near future (say, two
months  ahead) will raise the present opportunity cost of water. As soon as the opportunity cost of water
reaches the operating cost of the most expensive thermal genco all available thermal plants will be in
operation into the system; water in reservoirs will only be used to prevent outages. Since the spot price can
rise well above the node price as the energy restriction unfolds, gencos that are net buyers face an unpleasant
situation. 34 These companies would benefit from more water being  released from the reservoirs  if (i) there is
the possibility that they do not have to pay compensations  in the event of an outage (shifting the cost to
users), (ii) that it may rain, thus avoiding an outage at the last minute,  as had happened in 1997, or (iii) that
they might be able to avoid paying the spot price to gencos that are net sellers during the outage.
The fact that a genco bases its operations on speculations  about the future rains is not necessarily  inefficient,
as long as the speculator is made to absorb the cost of bad outcomes  onto other participants  in the market,
i.e., if it faces the right prices. On the other hand, if gencos that are net buyers in the spot market do not
completely  internalize  the costs of a shortage, then they have incentives to use too much water from
reservoirs. 35 Figure 6 shows the weekly average of the spot price during 1998.36  The spot price remained
32 Bemdt (1991,  pp. 328--335)  reviews the international  evidence  and concludes  that the shor -run  demand elasticity is
between 0.1 and 0.2. More recent evidence  is reviewed  by Nesbakken (1999), suggests  that estimates  of the elasticity of
the short-run  residential  demand for energy vary considerably  across countries,  between 0.2 and 0.6.
33 The node price is about 40% of the representative  residential  bill. Hence, a fall of 25% of the node price implies
approximately  a 10% fall in the price paid by residential  users.
34 Note that the node price is normally  around  20 to 30 mills a KWh; the spot price is close to 60 mills per KWh when
the most expensive  thermal  plant sets the price, and it can climb  up to 330 mills a KWh  during a severe shortage.
35 This is an instance  of moral hazard caused  by the failure of regulatory governance.
36  As mentioned  before, beginning  in July 1998  there was disagreement  within CDEC  on the spot price. For this reason,
prices reported in the figure are not necessarily  official.
12close to 20 mills until mid-June,  because  hydro-power  supplied  a large fraction  of demand,  even though it
was well known that the La Nina phenomenon  was present and that reservoirs  were at low levels. Recall tlhat
energy in reservoirs fell by 2,300  GWh between  January and June. At the same time, at least 1,400  GWh of
thermal energy was not dispatched  during  those months. 37
As we have noted before, there have been claims  that the repeated  failure of the Nehuenco  plant was
responsible  for the excessive  use of water. Colbun, its owner, wanted  to have  Nehuenco on line as soon as,
possible,  thus reducing  its need to buy spot energy from more  expensive  thermal  gencos and there is no
reason to think that it willfully  misrepresented  information.  However,  as a net buyer it benefited from
optimistic  announcement,  since that would lower  the future (and hence  present) spot price, thus allowing
more water to be drawn  from reserves.  The third important  player in the power generation market, the
predominantly  thermal genco Gener,  was a net seller during  this period and thus was in favor of higher spot
prices. Gener proposed a methodology  to account for the uncertain  entry of Nehuenco,  but its proposal A  as
not adopted. 3 8
The spot price climbed to 60 mills during the first week in July as energy consumption  increased  and the
more expensive  thermal plants where dispatched  (see Figure 6). In early July CDEC\ predicted a shortage of
85 GWh during the second  half of July. 39 As we have mentioned before,  the Ministry of Public Works used
the risk of outages as an argument  to sell Endesa the equivalent  of 500 GWh of water from the Laja and
Maule reservoirs  which were originally earmarked for agricultural irrigation.40  41  4'  The terms of the
agreement  were not made public, but it appears  that Endesa  was given free hand to use the water, since it run
its hydro  plants at full capacity during  July and August,  displacing  thermal generation  while the water lasted.
Indeed,  water in the Laj  a reservoir  was valued at a price of 0 for the purposes of dispatch. 43
It can be easily shown with a simple model  that whenever  a shortage  is imminent  the opportunity cost of
water equals the outage cost. As seen before, in that case all available  thermal  plants should be operating  .at
full capacity. Thus, a simple indication  of excessive  use of water during July and August is that some
available  thermoelectric  plants were not in operation.  Clearly, a fraction of the water was needed to prevent
outages,  but a conservative  estimate  is that at least an additional  65 GWh could have been generated  by
37 We compute this number  as follows.  First, we determined  the number  of days where an "inefficient" thermal plant
(as defined by CNE;\  see Generaci6n  bruta  mensual SIC-SING  at http://www.cne.cl/cnenew/electricidad/electric.htm
was not dispatched  at all.  Then we multiplied this number  by the daily average  energy produced by the inefficient
generator  in November 1998,  where thermal generators  where run at almost  full capacity  (i.e. in this way we
constructed  a proxy of each plant's  capacity).  The estimate  is conservative  because  we ignored  days where plants were
run at less than full capacity.
38 See Camara de Diputados  (1999,  p. 103).
39 See Camara de Diputados  (1999,  p. 106).
40 This amount of energy,  valued at the outage  cost (140 mills per KWh) is worth about US$70  million; according :o
Camara de Diputados  (1999, p. 35), Endesa  paid between US$2,2 and 2,4 million.
41 Water in reservoirs  can be used for electricity  generation and for irrigation.  Water from the Laja reservoir  can be
freely extracted  for generation  when its volume exceeds 500 million m .Below that level, however,  extraction for
generation  cannot exceed  47 m 3/sec. Endesa argued that the minimum  level of the lake was lower than previously
estimated  (in other words, the reservoir  could hold more water than originally  thought). Consequently,  the cota at
which the lake contained  500 million  m3was not 1,316.93  m but 1,313.18  m (Camara de Diputados [1999, p. 57]).
Hence, Endesa  argued that it could freely use that water. The Ministry of Public  works apparently  accepted that
argument.
42 The Maule  reservoir  has capacity for 1,500  million m 3. When the volume is larger than 670 million m
3. Colbun, a
hydro generator, can use the water freely.  When the level is lower than 170  million  m3, all water is reserved for
agricultural  irrigation.  In the intermediate  range use for generation  requires authorization  by the Ministry of Public
Works.
43 See Camara de Diputados  (1998, p. 21)
13thermal  plants during July and August.44  Consequently,  the spot price fell as thermal  generation was
displaced  and in addition,  Endesa was able to stop being a net buyer of energy for a while.
It is hard to explain why the water provided to Endesa  in July 1998 was not sold at "market" prices, or
subject to the condition  that it should not substitute  for thermoelectric  generation.  Note that the November
1998 outages  were caused  by energy  deficits of 76 GWh,  which  were similar  to the 65 GWh of thermal
generation displaced  by hydro generation  during  July and August.  Endesa (supported  by some members of
the CNE) argued that it owned the water and therefore  has the right to use it when it saw fit, which  of course
meant that merit order of operations  did not apply,  contrary  to the spirit of the law and economic
arguments. 45 Dispatch should be decided by OMSIC,  regardless  of the private interest of the owner of the
plant.
The disputes among gencos and the non-optimal  use of reservoir  water were at least in part the result of the
CDEC's govemance structure.  Until September 1998,  decisions  in CDEC required a consensus  and all
members had veto power. In practice,  however,  the two  gencos that were in a net buying  position  were in
powerful  bargaining position. First,  until May 1999  CDEC conducted  operations  in the headquarters  of
Transelec,  Chile's main transco,  which is fully  owned by Endesa.  Endesa was the agent with the best
information  about the state of the reservoirs  and in practice  ran the system. Second, disagreements  within
CDEC had to be referred  to the Minister  of Economics,  who could take up to four months to issue a decision
and was usually reluctant  to intervene  in conflicts  between  gencos. Moreover,  the cost of ignoring the
decision  of the regulator  does not seem  to have been high, given good legal advice,  because courts are slow
and do not understand  complex  technical  issues.
A third reason for the overuse of reserves was a gross overestimation  of the amount  of snow collected in the
Andes, which would provide  runoff  to feed rivers and reservoirs  from December  to March.  According to one
regulator,  it became known only in November that  there would be much less water than in the worse
previous drought  of 1968-69.46  Nevertheless,  the consulting  firm that  predicts the amount of water available
and advises CDEC, which was fully owned by Endesa  at the time, made predictions  that became steadily
worse from September  to November, even  though  there is little snowfall  after mid-September.  There is no
reason to think that the consulting  firm misrepresented  information.  Nevertheless,  there were no independent
checks on these predictions  despite the obvious conflict  of interest, since  more optimistic  announcements
lead to the use of more reservoir  water and to lower spot prices, which is profitable for a net buyer such as
Endesa. The regulator did have independent  information  that the there was less snow available from late
August,  when the Ministry of Public Works reported  that its measurement  stations  showed snow levels were
far below normal, but it did not react to this information.
As we have mentioned before, the legal changes introduced  by the statute  of the law have made the CDEC
far more independent  (though some analysts question  this fact). This should help in case of a future drought.
However,  it is an open question whether the newly independent  CDEC is strong enough to withstand the
pressures of gencos and the regulator.  As suggested  by the experience  of 1998-1999,  net buyers of power
have strong incentives  and the ability to lobby for using reservoir water. This tends to aggravate  the effects
of the years with little rainfall.
The importance of small details: The spot market We have mentioned  before that in early July, the more
expensive  thermoelectric  units becarne active and the spot price climbed to 60 mills. Endesa  claimed that
this spot price was not acceptable arguing  that the repeated failures of Nehuenco  had forced Endesa to use
44 This  estimate  was  obtained  using  the procedure  described  in footnote  37
45 See Camara de Diputados (1999,  p. 19 and 61).
46 Camara  de Diputados  (1999,  p. 14).
47 See  Camara  de Diputados  (1999,  p. 117).
14its water reserves  too quickly, so the spot price could not be calculated running the model. 48 The Minister
eventually  issued a veredict, but in december of the following  year. Moreover, by early November,  it had
become  clear that  1998-99 would be far drier than  1968-69, the driest year considered in the node price
calculations.  There was very little spare capacity because Nehuenco was still out of order. Thus, when a
coal-fuelled  thermoelectric  plant was unexpectedly  shut down for maintenance (Gener's Ventanas II) and
Endesa's combined  cycle gas plant San Isidro failed, a shortage occurred.  Electricity was rationed via
random and unannounced  cuts. The spot price should have climbed to the outage cost, but additional
disputes between  gencos ensued. Endesa and Colbfin claimed that there would have been no shortage with
the hydrology  of 1968-69. Given this claim these two gencos offered two different lines of argument  to
avoid paying the outage cost: Endesa argued that the limitations of compensations  to users also applied to
spot price transactions,  and hence energy exchanges between  gencos should be valued at the variable  cost of
the most  expensive thermoelectric plant (about 60 mills per KWh). Colbuin argued that the spot price should
have been calculated  simulating OMSIC under the  1968-69 hydrology, leading to lower spot prices  (at most
60 mills according  to Colbuin). 49 Hence, for one reason or another there was no official spot price to value
energy transfers  since the second half of 1998 and until mid-i 999.5°  Net sellers still had to supply energy
because of mandatory  dispatch regulations, even though they did not know at which price and when they
would be paid.
The clispute was referred to the Economics  Minister who requested an opinion from the head of the CNE (as
required  by the law). The CNE answered within five days that energy exchanges during a shortage should be
valued at the outage cost. 51 Nevertheless,  the minister took almost four months  to reach a decision  (March
26). The verdict agreed with the CNE, but its efficacy was weakened by adding that the CDEC should
determine  when shortages occurred in November  1998. This addition made the decision void of content,
since any dispute within the CDEC would be blocked by the gencos that would lose by the decision.
While no details have been made public, it seems reasonable  to think that the delays and the ambiguity in the
verdict were  caused by lobbying pressures. The Economics  Minister could have settled the dispute by stating
that shortages had occurred using the records of physical outages that were registered by CDEC. Moreover.
he could have asked the SEC to investigate  the reason for the inexistence of a spot price, an anomalous
situation, and to fine gencos who had behaved negligently.  Thus, the government gave an unambiguous
signal that it would not intervene effectively to settle disputes.
The lack of a spot price had serious consequences.  Given that net sellers of energy expect they will be paid a
price for energy that is lower than the outage cost, they have fewer incentives to add additional capacity  tc
ease the shortage,  or to buy back energy from free clients and self--generators. 52 At the same time, net
buyers of energy also face weaker incentives to help ease the shortage. Since no compensations  are being
paid, the cost of not supplying energy to regulated users is small and they feel little pressure to add capacily
or to buy back energy from free clients and self generators. In fact net buyers did not allow self-generators  to
sell in the spot market,  which meant that about 100 MW of power did not reach the market. 53 Of course,
these incentives are moderated by the fear of political retribution:  Endesa added around 450 MW of diesel
turbines, even though the above arguments would indicate that it was not in its best interests. Unfortunately,
these additions arrived only gradually between  February  and April  1999. In the meantime, between
December and March an additional 400 GWh of energy  stored in reservoirs  was used. 54
48 See Iglesias  (1999).
49  Landerretche  (1998).
50  See the tables with spot prices in http://www.cne.cl.
51 See Landerretche  (1998).
52 Self generators  are users who are connected  to the system  but who own their own power plants (e.g. paper mills,
shopping  malls, etc.).
53 See Camara de Diputados (1999,  p. 108).
54 CNE (1999)  argues that this water had to be used anyway  for irrigation  purposes.
15Demand-side  management To reduce consumption the regulator implemented  three measures. First,
voltage  was reduced by 7,5%. Second, public offices were instructed to reduce "unnecessary"  consumptions.
Third, the government launched an ineffective and lukewarm campaign asking the population  to save
energy. Nevertheless,  the main regulatory  instrument for managing a supply restriction is the rationing
decree. It allows distributors to cut service without being fined and forces gencos to ration their clients and
to compensate  regulated users for the energy they do not supply, within the limitations of article 99 bis of
the law. 55
Demand management  under rationing  follows a complex procedure. Each day, CDEC must determine
whether projected  demand exceeds available energy for the next day, in which case a 'restriction'  is
necessary.  The deficit is analyzed as if it were an additional plant whose 'production'  must be allocated
among gencos.  Each genco allocates her share of the deficit among its clients, either by agreeing  to
decreases  in consumption or with outages if the agreements are not sufficient. The computation  of the deficit
is used to determine  the compensations  to be paid to regulated users, since they are based on undelivered
energy.
The efficiency of the mechanism depends on two conditions. The first is the accuracy with which daily
deficits are calculated.  In principle, determining whether there is a deficit is simple, since it is an output of
the OMSIC model. The problem is that residual water in reservoirs can almost always be used to match
supply and demand for energy, so determining  whether a restriction exists becomes a political  issue, hence
political pressures  can be used. Moreover, the executive appears to have believed that the political  cost of
energy rationing was large, and tried to avoid announcing that rationing was needed  for as long as possible.
The executive  shied away from issuing a rationing decree in July 1998, when the CDEC predicted  a shortage
and chose instead to grant Endesa the use of additional water. In September the executive  ignored a
rationing  recommendation  of the CNE, and waited until outages in November made it inevitable.  From
December  through March  1999, Nehuenco was operational and there were no outages, so the executive
pressed the CDEC not to declare restrictions  and hence there was no reduction in consumption  during those
months. This meant that the scant water in reservoirs was still being used after November,  leaving the
reservoirs  almost empty by late March, when Nehuenco broke down for a long period, thus causing a new
round of shortages.
The second key condition of the rationing mechanism is the existence of compensations  to regulated  users.
The problem  is that the electric law has loose ends that hamper the application  of the compensations
mechanism,  so its effectiveness  depends on the behavior of regulators, specially the SEC. Since the
compensation mechanism is complex  and has never been applied, few if any users have any understanding
of how it works. 56 Part of the reason is that compensations  are calculated and then paid to users by
distribution companies,  who nevertheless  act as simple conveyors of the payments,  for the compensations
are paid by gencos that are in deficit and unable to fulfill their contractual  obligations. Hence, distribution
companies,  which interact with users, have no incentives to explain the mechanism to users because they do
not benefit from the reduction in consumption.  Moreover, provided that a rationing decree  is in force, the
law allows the distributor to administer  shortages using power cuts, at no cost. Consequently,  there are no
agents with an incentive to push for compensations  and hence little political pressure  in favor of enforcing
the compensations mechanism,  while there is considerable pressure from gencos to avoid paying them.57 58
55  This is the only case when a distributor  cab cut service without  being liable for damages.
56 Even during  the shortage  few economists  were aware  of the existence  of compensations.  When the mechanism  was
explained in academic  seminars  it took participants  some time to understand  its intricacies.
57  The difference  between the outage  cost and the node price is about 100 mills.  Hence, each GWh that is not supplied
to regulated  users should  originate  about US$  100,000  in compensations.  Since the aggregate  deficit was about 450
16Moreover,  the law is ambiguous  about the precise  conditions  under which compensations  are to be paid. Part
of this ambiguity stems from the fact  that the amounts to be compensated  must be determined  by runmning  the
OMSIC  model. Hence, unless there is strong  action  on the part of the regulator,  compensations  will not be
paid. For example, as soon as outages  began in November and the rationing  decree was dictated, gencos  in
deficit claimed that no compensations  were due because  with an hydrology like 1968-69  all contracts  couldl
have been fulfilled, so that the limitation  of article  99 bisapplied.  The SEC did not perform an independent
evaluation  of these claims and accepted  them at face value, despite the evident conflicts of interest of the
claimants.
During the next hydrological  year that began in April 1999,  the same gencos  argued that forecasts indicatel
that La Niiia would be in Chile at least until August,  implying  that no compensations  were due since  article
99 bisdid not consider compensations  when there were droughts  for two years in a row. The winter of 1999"-
00, however, was normal, so that according  to the law, compensations  should have been paid for all the
outages  that occurred  between  April and June. Nevertheless  the SEC did not enforce  the payment of
compensations  even when all the required conditions  concurred. 59
The SEC attempted to enforce compensations  only when the limitation  in article  99 bis was eliminated  afte  r
the law was changed in June 1999.  Then it claimed  that compensations  had to be paid during all of the
period while a rationing  decree was in force, even in those days when no deficit was predicted by CDEC.
Gencos,  by contrast,  argued that compensations  were due only in those days when an actual deficit was
predicted  by CDEC. A legal battle ensued  which  has yet to be resolved.  In any case, the fact that SEC
attempted to enforce compensations  even after the shortage  ended and on days were no deficit occurred
suggests that it viewed them as fines but not as a price meant to transmit the opportunity  cost of energy to
users.
4.  Conclusions
The Chilean electricity  shortage is a good case study of the interaction of regulatory  incentives and
govemance.  It reveals that price system is fundamentally rigid and inadequate  to accomodate large supply
and demand shocks that are endemic to Chile's energy conditions.  For example, the node price, which  is paid
by regulated users, fell by more than 25% between April  1998 and April  1999, while the country was
experiencing the worst  drought on record. Compensations to regulated users are supposed to transmit the
opportunity cost of energy to users during shortage. Nevertheless,  the law contained a fundamental
inconsistency,  the limitation of compensations  in article 99 bis. This limitation created an incomplete  price
system and made it easier for gencos that were net buyers to claim that no compensations  were due. Even
without the limitation,  it is unlikely that the compensations  mechanism would have worked.  It is
cumbersome  to apply, few if any users are aware of it (much less understand its workings) and it had been
successfully  challenged  in court in the past.
Similarly, the spot price did not fulfill its role during the shortage because gencos that were net buyers in thl,
spot market avoided paying the outage cost by means of disputing CDEC's  operational  decisions. The
failure of the price system made it worthwhile to postpone or avoid the installation of additional capacity.
GWh, and regulated  users make about 60% of total  consumption,  paid compensations  are estimated at about US$25
million.
58 During the latter  part of the shortage  some members  of Congress  and majors pressured for the mechanism  to be
applied.
59  It has been pointed out to us that the limitation  of compensations  in article  99 bis could have been used nonetheless
to challenge in court any attempt to enforce compensations,  and that this may have discuraged  the SEC to proceed.
17Endesa only began installing  additional  turbines in February 1999.  Furthermore,  self generators  did not have
any incentives  to sell into the spot market and gencos  did not have any incentive  to negotiate reductions  of
consunption with their free clients.  In sum, during the shortage  neither  users nor gencos  confronted  the true
opportunity cost of energy,  and hence  decisions  were inefficient.
In addition,  a fundamental  moral hazard problem  is embedded  in the Chilean system.  As a supply restriction
develops, gencos that are net buyers have strong  incentives  to press for the release  of water in reservoirs,
because it reduces current spot prices while the cost of future shortages  is partly shifted to users and other
gencos. Too much water was used at two key instances:  during  the first  half of 1998 due to excessively
optimistic forecasts of Nehuenco's  entry; and between July and September  1998,  when the government
postponed a rationing decree  and granted  additional  water to Endesa  without setting any conditions  on its
use. This moral hazard problem  makes supply restrictions  more  likely.
As Williamson  (1985 ch.  1) has stressed,  when transactions  cannot be (or are not) organized under a price
system, governance  structures  become the main determinant  of resource allocation.  Despite  of the fact that
the system received two large supply shocks (the protracted  failure  of Nehuenco  and the driest year on
record) there is compelling  evidence  suggesting  that it was possible  to run the system  with no outages,,
which suggests that regulatory  governance  in Chile is inadequate  to manage a supply restriction.
60 The total
deficit was about 450 GWh; an efficient  management  of water in reservoirs  during 1998,  or a regulator
willing to use its powers  to enforce  the price system, or an executive  less  worried about its image and less
fearful of the political costs of decreeing  rationing,  would have been enough to release far more than 450
GWh of energy.
Governance  failed on two different  levels. First, the governance  of CDEC was inadequate  during the
shortage.  CDEC was not independent  and gencos  had veto power  on the legal validity  of its operational
decisions.  It is remarkable  that neither  the law nor the complementary  statutes  contemplated  provisions to
expedite payments for energy  transfers  in the spot market. This loophole  probably  stems from the fact that
the law was designed when the electricity  sector was state owned,  in which case wealth transfers among
different firms due to regulatory  mistakes  are not very relevant.  This situation  has improved somewhat  since
the establishment  of an independent  operations  directorate  whose operational  decisions are legally binding.
Second, a careful  analysis of the role of regulators  during the shortage  shows that their behavior did not stem
from lack of powers.  While it is true that fines were very small until the law was changed  in June 1999 and
that regulatory  decisions can be contested  in court, the regulator  had several  unused powers. First, the
Economics  Minister did not settle disputes  between  gencos effectively,  which was key for the price system
to work and failed to investigate  the breakdown  of the spot market. Second,  the Ministry of Public Works
sold water reserves at prices far below their opportunity  cost without setting conditions  on their use. Third,
the Ministry of Economics  repeatedly  failed  to issue and enforce a rationing  decree  until it was forced to do
it by outages. Fourth, the SEC did not enforce  the payment of compensations  and did not show a clear
understanding  of how and under which circumstances  they should be paid. When it suddenly  changed its
behavior  and tried to make gencos  pay, it interpreted  compensations  as a fine but not as a price whose role
was to transmit  the opportunity  cost of energy  to regulated  users. Moreover,  government  officials  did not
seem aware that the article 99 bis left an incomplete  price system, thus failing  to address the problem. We
believe the weakness  of the regulators  stems from two sources:  the vulnerability  of the executive (which is
the hierarchical  superior of all regulators)  to the concentrated  lobbying  power of genco's without
countervailing  lobbies from disaggregated  users; and from their limited understanding  of the incentives
underlying  the price system  under a supply restriction.
60 In fact, similar  restrictions were managed in 1989  and in 1990 without  outages.
18The lessons  from 1998-1999  shortage go beyond Chile's electricity  sector.  The shortage shows the
limitations  of a price system  requiring  heavy intervention  of the regulator  under supply restrictions.  Even the
most detailed law designed to avoid discretion  invariably  leaves  loose ends and loopholes.  While it is
usually thought  that Chile has strong regulatory  institutions  by developing  country standards,  the shortage
showvs  that thsee governance  structures  are ill suited to fill in the loopholes  left by the law. Thus, it is like.  y
that conditions  are even worse in most other developing  countries.
These shortcomings  do not stem from lack of formal  powers,  but from the fact that incentives  during a
shortage  prevent the regulator  from settling disputes  efficiently.  Thus, loopholes  will have unanticipated
effects and disputes will eventually  be settled  by haggling  and lobbying.  In our view this suggests that
developing  countries should  rely as much as possible on market  rules that clearly allocate property rights ex
ante and leave the tenns of contracts  to be freely  negotiated  between  private parties, thus making the
regulator's intervention  unnecessary.  Thus, an implication  of our analysis is that liberalization  is even move
desirable  when regulatory  governance  is weak.
In the case of Chile, at least, enforcement  of property  rights and contracts is very strong so that it is feasible
to follow this approach.  For example, it is noteworthy  that the same gencos  that disputed prices in the spot
market  had no problems in fulfilling to the letter the long-term  contracts  that ruled part of their energy
transfers  during the shortage.
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*  2,300 GWh of water in reservoirs  is used.
*  Thermal  plants are seldom  run.
*  Plants at the Laja are run close  to capacity;  all water in Colbuin  reservoir is used.
*  Spot price remains low.
*  Protracted  failure of Nehuenco  to enter.
July 1998
*  Spot price climbs violently in early July as CDEC\ predicts shortage.
*  Endesa disputes  dispatch price. Divergence  goes to the Economics Minister.  Verdict delayed  until
December.
*  Endesa  receives additional  water in Laja and Maule reservoirs. Estimated  amount is about 500 GWh.
July-August  1998
*  Additional  500 GWh of energy stored  in reservoirs is used.
*  Some thermal  plants are not run, despite of the fact that additional water in reservoirs is given to Endesa
to the specific purpose  of prevent shortage
*  Nehuenco  repeatedly  fails to enter.
20September--October  1998
*  Government decides  not to decree  rationing,  despite a September  report of CNE advising it.
*  Some rain eases restriction  and delays shortage.
*  Nehuenco repeatedly  fails to enter.
*  Energy stored in reservoirs falls an additional 1  10 GWh in September  and 34 GWh in October,  bringig
reserves to only 718 GWh  by the end of October.
November 1998
*  Endesa  reports that thaw is far worse than expected.
*  Ventanas II plant (about  5 GWh of daily production)  goes into unplanned  maintenance  on November 5.
*  Random outages  begin on November 11 through  November  26. Government  decrees rationing on
November 11.  Estimated  unserved  energy is about 76 GWh;  daily deficit about 8 GWh.
*  Endesa and Colbuin  claim that draught  is worse than 1968-69,  that  under that year's hidrology they
would have fulfilled all their contracts,  and thus, that no compensations  to regulated  users are due.
*  Endesa and Colbuin  claim that the draught isforce  majeure and that spot price cannot be the outage cost.
Divergence  goes to the Minister of Economics.
e  Nehuenco  enters on November  24, easing the shortage.
*  Energy stored in reservoirs falls an additional  43 GWh bringing reserves  to only 575 GWh at the end of
the month
December  1998
*  Energy stored in reservoirs falls an additional 110 GWh  bringing reserves  to only 460 GWh at the end of
the month.
*  Rationing decree is not renewed  when current expires on December 31.
*  Restriction is lifted.
January 1999
*  Energy stored in reservoirs falls an additional 100  GWh  bringing reserves to only 360 GWh at the end of
the month.
February 1999
*  Energy  stored in reservoirs  falls an additional 100  GWh bringing reserves  to only 250 GWh at the end of
the month.
*  Endesa's San Antonio 1  50MW  plant enters in full capacity.
March 1998
*  Energy stored in reservoirs falls an additional 114  GWh bringing reserves  to only 136  GWh at the end of
the month.
*  Endesa's Cabreros  turbines (170 MW) enter.
April 1999
*  Nehuenco  brakes down, and outages  return.
*  An additional  90 GWh in Endesa's  Cabreros  central enter.
*  24 days of deficit  with 160  GWh of unserved  energy.
*  Endesa's  Cabreros  Turbines (170 MW) enter.
*  Endesa's  Antilhue  turbines (50 MW) enter.
*  Endesa's  Antilhue  turbines (73 MW) enter.
21*  A new rationing  decree is dictated on April 30. Proportional  rationing  is imposed.
May  1999
*  Nehueneco  briefly returns, but is unable to run at full capacity  except for a couple of days.
*  25 days of deficit with 134  GWh of unserved  energy.
June 1999
*  Nehuenco  breaks down again.
*  17 days of deficit with 79 GWh of unserved  energy.
*  Rationing  ends June 22, as rains ease the shortage.
22Table 1
Installed capacity in 1998
Group  Thermo  Hydro  Total
Endesa  599  2,692.7  3,291.7
Colbu(n  370  697  1,067
Gener  1,194.5  2,44.9  1,439.4
Others  187.3  885  1,072.3




(normal  year  =  100)
(a) Whole hydrological  year
Reservoirs  Normal  1968-69  1998-99
Rapel  loo  15  24
Invernada  100  42  63
Colbun  100  35  37
Laja  100  52  34
Chapo  100  106  71
Melado  100  37  39
Source: CDEC
(b) November  through  March
Reservoir  Normal  1968-69  1998-99
Rapel  100  6  11
Invernada  100  28  36
Colbun  100  34  22
Laja  100  58  29
Chapo  100  138  64
Melado  100  35  26
Source: CDEC
24Table 3
Number of idle days, inefficient plants
January 1998-March 1999
Plant  Diego de  Huasco  Huasco  Indio  Laguna  Renca
Almagro  TG  TV  Verde
January-June  144  113  155  143  155  155
July-August  12  8  9  11  10  20
September-  I  1  8  10  6  20  14
March
Total  167  131  174  160  185  189




0D  0)  CD  00
0  0  0  M  0)  0





















o  O  ,OV0  0  0  0  0  °
Apr-86
































Dec- 96  -
Ap,-97  -_  _  _  _
Au-  97





The compensation  mechanism
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